Tor and onion services
Lawful use onlyLawful Tor onion services for journalism, whistleblowing, privacy, and censorship resistance. We run five in production today, including a publicly verifiable address directory, and we build the same class of infrastructure for organisations that need it.
This is not a side experiment. It is the infrastructure problem we already solved for ourselves, offered to clients who face blocking, seizure, surveillance, or simply an audience that cannot safely visit an ordinary website.
Everything on this page is for lawful purposes. We do not build, host, operate, or advise on marketplaces, forums, or any service that deals in illegal goods, and we do not provide anonymity or hosting for unlawful activity in any form.
We will ask what your service is for. If the answer cannot be stated plainly, we decline the work.
The claim on this page is backed by systems that are live right now.
5
Onion services in production
6
Servers we own and operate
25+
Services under management
0
Tracking, ads, or third-party requests
Not demos. A private Matrix homeserver that has no clearnet exposure at all, a Tor-only webmail instance, censorship-resistant static mirrors, and Yardland — our public verified address directory. Each is a separate hidden service with its own key, its own listener, and its own hardening.
Tor work is only as private as the machine underneath it. We run our own estate rather than renting managed hosting, so we control the kernel, the network path, and every log — including the ones we choose not to keep.
An Ed25519 release key in an isolated keyring, detached signatures over published artifacts, and a signed checksum manifest covering every served page. Readers can verify what they downloaded without trusting the server that served it.
A v3 onion address is a public key, so a real address and a phishing clone look equally random. We built the method that tells them apart — provenance tiers, live liveness checks, and published evidence — and we apply it to our own services first.
Client onion addresses are never published here. Only our own public services are listed.
Five onion services, live and in production today. Each is a separate hidden service with its own key. We publish the addresses so you can check the work rather than take our word for it.
Onion addresses only resolve inside Tor. They will not load in Chrome, Safari, Edge, or Firefox, and clicking one in an ordinary browser sends a DNS lookup for that address to your internet provider — which tells them you were interested in it. Open these in Tor Browser instead.
Addresses appear in full so you can compare them against the ones in Yardland's signed manifest. In a v3 onion address the string is the identity — changing one character produces a completely different service, which is why we publish them to be checked rather than just linked.
Our signed directory of onion services run by identifiable organisations. Carries a published Ed25519 fingerprint, so you can verify the manifest without trusting the server that served it.
j3p23pcegmbsb7ma56qlivhw6a347dgd6uoipermqqwnymg46xq7wyyd.onionOpen to anyone.
A single self-contained page served from a home server and reachable only through Tor. No tracking, no ads, no third-party requests — the whole document arrives in one request, so there is nothing to correlate.
6h2rjeieyscgca2oegq6lqw2turwgh7x3oips6ntyn5ycl7mfurmwcid.onionOpen to anyone.
A Matrix homeserver with the Cinny web client, running with no clearnet exposure at all. Demonstrates stateful, authenticated, multi-user infrastructure outside the ordinary web.
pgxh6q4vags7qni3gfmifvuj7umxdvdgkyarfg6stxxneq7rr3oyn2ad.onionInvitation only. This is the Cinny web client.
SnappyMail served exclusively through an onion service, so correspondence never traverses a conventional mail path. Suits operators who cannot use ordinary email.
2ggdpv3wixaih22upfka3sfwomqhki7ze7v7qda4bbsjjgrj37a5v4qd.onionAccount required.
The homeserver behind the chat service, reachable only as an onion service with clearnet federation disabled. There is no web page here — this is the API endpoint, and it is the fifth of the five we operate.
uqpfyz53unggexgwbtvv3oaklvkcvnrgmf56azya6esrqsx6zm73stad.onionTechnical endpoint, not a web page.
Each of these starts with your threat model, because the same technology protects very different things depending on who is asking.
Stand up a v3 onion service properly: key custody, isolated listeners, hardened headers, no access logs, and a deployment path you can repeat on demand rather than rebuild by hand.
The class of system newsrooms use to receive material safely — designed around your threat model, with the operational procedures that actually keep sources safe, not just the software.
Mirror a site, a document set, or a publication so it stays reachable when the ordinary route is blocked, filtered, or seized — including correct onion advertisement so readers land on the right copy.
Mail, chat, or file exchange that never touches the clearnet, for teams operating under blocking or surveillance.
Build the verification layer for your own onion presence: signed address publication, provenance records, and monitoring for third parties publishing your name against an address you do not control.
A hard look at what your setup reveals — metadata, timing, logs, key custody, and the human process around it. Most onion failures are operational, not cryptographic.
Anonymity is a legitimate tool for journalists, sources, activists, and anyone whose safety depends on not being identifiable. We provide it for lawful purposes, and we say where the line sits before any conversation rather than after.
If what you need is lawful, we will tell you honestly whether an onion service actually solves it — and say so if it does not.
Describe the situation, the threat, and who needs to reach you. We will tell you whether an onion service solves it, and what it would take.
Start a conversationWe take on lawful work only.